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TRUSTS - RIGHTS OF SUCCESSIVE BENEFICIARIES TO CORPORATE STOCK
DIVIDENDS - ORDINARY AND EXTRAORDINARY DIVIDENDS - Testatrix died
in March, 1935 leaving 5,471 shares of N corporation stock in two trusts with
directions that a portion of the income therefrom should be paid to her son
during his life with remainder over to another. At the time of testatrix' death
the N corporation had a large surplus, and had been paying regular quarterly
dividends from current income. From April, 1935 to December, 1937 these
quarterly dividends were continued at one dollar per share less than was customary, but because of business conditions they were paid partly from the surplus
which had accumulated prior to the death of testatrix. These payments from
surplus reduced the book value of the stock about seven dollars per share. The
trustees petitioned the court for directions as to whether these dividends paid
partly from surplus accruing before the time of the trust were to be treated as
income and paid to the life beneficiary, or whether they were to be considered
a return of capital and paid into the corpus of the trust. Held, since the will does
not express testatrix' intent in this matter, these dividends are to be treated as
ordinary cash dividends, and they are payable to the life tenant as income. In re
Estate of Boyle, 235 Wis. 591, 294 N. W. 29 (1940).
In considering the question as to the rights of successive beneficiaries of a
trust to dividends paid on corporate stock which constitutes the corpus of the
trust, the Wisconsin court has, as this case indicates, always followed what is
known as the Pennsylvania rule.1 Under this rule a distinction is made between

1 There are two other rules followed by American courts in this situation. Under
the first, known as the Massachusetts rule, the courts look only to the form in which
the dividend is paid, holding that all cash dividends are payable to the term beneficiary
as income, and that all stock dividends are payable to the trust as a return of capital.
Under the second rule, known as the Kentucky rule, the courts look only to the time
the dividends are received, holding that if the dividend is received during the term of
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an ordinary and an extraordinary dividend. If the dividend in question is found
to be an ordinary dividend, it is allotted to the life beneficiary of the trust irrespective of the source from which it is paid; 2 and if the dividend is extraordinary, it is also given to the life beneficiary unless it is shown that such
payment would impair the corpus of the trust, and thus reduce the value of the
trust to the remainderman. 8 This rule, however, raises a problem to which the
courts have given little discussion, that of distinguishing between an ordinary
and an extraordinary dividend. In the Restatement of Trusts it is said that this
distinction depends upon the facts, circumstances, and nature of each transaction, 4 and then six circumstances are listed as being important in the determination of the question. 5 The court in the present case follows this Restatement
rule and finds that the circumstances indicate an ordinary dividend. The Pennsylvania courts have held in the same general way that ordinary dividends are
those paid at more or less customary rates and uniform intervals. 6 The New
York courts use the same approach, 1 although they look to the regularity of the
period at which the dividends are paid 8 to see whether a continuing policy is
indicated 9 and they are not influenced by the size of the dividend.10 The
courts that have followed this rule have done so for the reason that the equities
of the life beneficiary and remainderman demand an exact distribution which
cannot be obtained by a "rule of thumb." 11 However, the fact remains that
the life beneficiary, it is payable to him as income, and if it is received before or
after his term, the dividend goes to the trust as capital. Neither of these rules makes it
necessary to distinguish between an ordinary or an extraordinary dividend. 4 BoGERT,
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 843 (1935).
2 Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 ( I 8 57) ; McKeown's Estate, 263 Pa. 78, I06 A.
189 (1919); Waterhouse's Estate, 308 Pa. 422, 162 A. 295 (1932); McLouth v.
Hunt, 154 N. Y. 179, 48 N. E. 548 (1897).
8
Smith's Estate, 140 Pa. 344, 21 A. 438 (1891); Lueder's Estate, 337 Pa. 155,
10 A. (2d) 415 (1940); Matter of Osborne, 209 N. Y. 450, rn3 N. E. 723, 823
(1913); Estate of Gerlach, 177 Wis. 251, 188 N. W. 94 (1922); Will of Jenkins,
199 Wis. 131, 225 N. W. 733 (1929).
4 I TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, comment on § 236a (1935).
5
The circumstances as listed in TRUST'S RESTATEMENT, comment on § 236a at
p. 236 (1935) are: (1) whether similar dividends have been paid with regularity in
the past; (2) whether such dividends are regularly paid out of current earnings;
(3) the frequency with which such dividends are declared; (4) the size of the dividends
in relation to the value of the shares; (5) the designation, if any, placed upon it by the
directors of the corporation, and ( 6) the source of the earnings from which the distribution is made. In the instant case the court found that the first, fourth, .fifth, and
part of the sixth circumstances pointed to an ordinary dividend.
6
Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 (1857); Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457 at 462,
139 A. 200 (1927); Opperman's Estate (No. 1), 319 Pa. 455, 179 A. 729 (1935).
1
Matter of Osborne, 209 N. Y. 450, I03 N. E. 723, 823 (1913).
8
Matter of Columbia Trust Co., 97 Misc. 566, 163 N. Y. S. 536 (1916).
9
Matter of Postley, 251 App. Div. 469, 296 N. Y. S. 627 (1937).
19
Lowry v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 172 N. Y. 137, 64 N. E. 796 (1902);
Matter of Postley, 251 App. Div. 469, 296 N. Y. S. 627 (1937).
11
Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 (1857); Smith's Estate, 140 Pa. 344, 21 A. 438
(1891).
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these very courts have adopted a "rule of thumb," for they use one in distinguishing between the ordinary and the extraordinary dividend, and by applying this terminology they decide whether or not they will make any attempt
to apportion the dividend. The result of this inconsistency is that they are leaving
an opening through which, by a series of dividends regularly declared at a
uniform rate from surplus accumulated before the trust took effect, the remainderman may lose a sizeable portion of the book value 12 of the shares to which he
is entitled under the terms of the trust.13 The New Jersey courts alone have
chosen to look through the terminology of "ordinary'' and "extraordinary" and
to protect the equities of the remainderman in the case of either type of dividend.14 It must be admitted, however, that there is justification for the other
courts' refusal to inquire into the source of all dividends in view of the expense
which would be involved in determining rights as to relatively small amounts.
So over a course of time the arbitrary result of the rule in some individual cases
will be balanced by this consideration of administrative convenience.15

John C. Johnston

12 The courts, although in disagreement as to method of apportionment, do agree
upon the proposition that the value of the stock to which the remainderman is entitled
is not the market value, but the intrinsic or book value. Smith's Estate, 140 Pa. 344,
21 A. 438 (1891); Stoke's Estate (No. 2), 240 Pa. 288, 87 A. 975 (1913); Waterhouse's Estate, 308 Pa. 422, 162 A. 295 (1932); Matter of Osborne, 209 N. Y.
450, 103 N. E. 723, 823 (1913); Matter of Bemis's Will, 123 Misc. 255, 205
N. Y. S. 367 (1924); State ex rel. Coykendal v. Karel, 215 Wis. 505, 255 N. W.
132 (1934).
13 Bourne v. Bourne, 240 N. Y. 172 at 176, 148 N. E. 180 (1925).
14 Lang v. Lang's Exr., 57 N. J. Eq. 325, 41 A. 705 (1898); McCracken v.
Gulick, 92 N. J. Eq. 214, 112 A. 317 (1920); Hagedorn v. Arens, 106 N. J. Eq.
377, 150 A. 5 (1930); Union County Trust Co. v. Gray, 110 N. J. Eq. 270, 159
A. 625 (1932); City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. McCarter, III N. J. Eq. 315, 162
A. 274 (1932), affd. in 114 N. J. Eq. 46, 168 A. 286 (1933); Graves v. Graves,
II5 N. J. Eq. 547, 171 A. 681 (1934); Bankers' Trust Co. of New York v. Lobdell,
116 N. J. Eq. 363, 173 A. 918 (1934).
15 The Pennsylvania court has indicated another consideration which makes this
rule seem less harsh,-that the life beneficiaries of these trusts are usually the widows
or children of the testator, while the remainderman is often a person more removed,
and thus not so likely to be a natural object of testator's bounty. Opperman's Estate
(No. 1), 319 Pa. 455, 179 A. 729 (1935).

